Some Judges Have ā Naturally ā Grown Skeptical of False Advertising Class Actions Challenging āNaturalā Labels
Among recent trends in consumer product false advertising class actions has been the rise in cases alleging false advertising for products touting ingredients as āall naturalā or ā100% natural.ā These lawsuits often point to any product label-language that could somehow be construed by consumers as referring to the product as ānatural,ā even when that is not what was intended by the manufacturer and would belie a reasonable reading of the product packaging. Recent decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals reflect a growing recognition that reasonable consumers would not be misled by a label that could be construed as referencing that a product is ānatural,ā particularly when those statements are ambiguous and other portions of the product packaging clearly disclose the purportedly non-natural ingredients. These cases provide a much-needed common sense approach to adjudicating false advertising class actions challenging label marketing claims related to the naturalness of a product.
We have previously written about the Ninth Circuitās decision in McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093 (9th Cir. 2023), where the court held that a consumer product manufacturer could rely on an ingredients list panel located on the back of the challenged product packaging to determine whether an ambiguous phrase on the front label was misleading or deceptive. Āé¶¹Ö±²„ has also previously analyzed district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit applying McGinity.Ģż
Just last week, in Bustamante et al. v. KIND, LLC, 2024 WL 1917155 (2d Cir. May 2, 2024), the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant food manufacturer in a false advertising class case challenging āall naturalā marketing claims. Bustamante provides a good illustration of how difficult it can be to appropriately define the label term āAll Naturalā as used on product packaging. In particular, the plaintiffs in Bustamante alleged that they were misled by the phrase āall naturalā on the labeling of snack bar products and brought state law consumer protection statutory claims on behalf three classes comprised of California, New York, and Florida consumers who purchased the product.
After the district court certified three damages classes under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden to present admissible evidence establishing how the challenged āAll Naturalā statement would mislead reasonable consumers acting reasonably. In opposition, plaintiffs pointed to several pieces of evidence to support their allegations that a reasonable consumer would interpret the phrase āAll Naturalā to mean that the products do not contain synthetic or artificial ingredients, including: (i) two expert reports; (ii) the named plaintiffsā testimony; (iii) defendantās internal documents; and (iv) the dictionary definition of the word ānatural.ā The district court granted defendantās motion for summary judgment because it found that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden in establishing a reasonable consumerās understanding of the phrase āAll Naturalā to prove deception, an essential element of their claims. Plaintiffs appealed.
In affirming, the Second Circuit found that plaintiffsā consumer perception expert evidence, which sought to establish that reasonable consumers view products with an āAll Naturalā descriptor as being free of artificial and synthetic ingredients, was correctly excluded because the survey on which it relied was biased and leading. Likewise, the appellate court held that the district court correctly excluded plaintiffsā expert chemist evidence, which challenged the term āAll Naturalā based on the composition of the productsā ingredients, because plaintiffsā expert neither analyzed the actual ingredients in the products nor considered how the actual product ingredients were sourced or manufactured. The court also determined that plaintiffsā expert evidence failed to present a cohesive definition of what a reasonable consumer would expect from products labeled āAll Natural.ā
In addition, the Second Circuit found that the testimony of the named plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a common objective understanding of the term āAll Naturalā that reflected the views held by āa reasonable consumer.ā Instead, the court noted that plaintiffsā own testimony established how divergent consumersā expectations can be as to the meaning of the phrase āAll Natural.ā Notably, several plaintiffs testified that consumers could have different understandings about the implications of the term āAll Natural,ā that these understandings could change over time, and that not everyone would agree with their understanding of that term.
The Second Circuit also determined that defendantās internal documents, which discussed defendantās understanding of what āAll Naturalā means, did not reveal a reasonable consumerās understanding of that term. The court similarly was unpersuaded by an ordinary dictionary definition of the word ānaturalā ā āexisting in or caused by nature; not made or caused by humankindā ā as sufficient for plaintiffs to meet their burden of establishing what a reasonable consumer acting reasonably expects from a product labeled āAll Naturalā in the context of applying it to a mass-produced snack bar wrapped in plastic.
Moreover, in an earlier district court decision issued out of the Second Circuit in the case of de Lacour et al v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 16-CV-8364 (KMW), 2024 WL 36820, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. January 3, 2024)[1], a review of governmental guidance on the term ānaturalā further confirmed that āthere are many interpretations of the word ānaturalāā because the governmental agencies weighing in on the termās meaning have not reached an agreement on a definition. For instance, the court noted that the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) solicited public comments regarding use of the term ānaturalā on food product packaging in 2015 but never promulgated a definition after receiving over 7,000 comments reflecting varying and wide-ranging understandings of the term. Because there is no objective governmental understanding of the term ānatural,ā the district court found that plaintiffs in that case could not meet their burden to establish a āreasonable consumerās understanding of ānatural.āā
Calls for federal regulators to provide clarity on the meaning and appropriate interpretation of the term ānaturalā have gone unanswered, and because of this ambiguity, it has been left to the courts to assess whether naturalness-based product marketing claims are deceptive. As the above cases demonstrate, a key issue in these cases is whether ānaturalnessā claims are ambiguous when viewed in context, such that courts can consider statements made on other parts of the product packaging in evaluating the plaintiffās allegations of deceptiveness. This point is particularly important in evaluating whether a claim can be successfully challenged at the motion to dismiss stage, where factual allegations must be construed in plaintiffās favor. These recent appellate decisions from the Ninth and Second Circuits take a more thoughtful and critical approach to adjudicating allegations of false or misleading ānaturalā labeling.
[1] The plaintiffs in de Lacour argued they were misled by the inclusion of the term ānaturalā on toothpaste and deodorant products and sought to certify a class of California, New York, and Florida consumers.