A version of this article was republished by on June 21, 2024.
This week, the full Federal Circuit overruled its decades-old test for deciding whether a design patent is invalid as obvious. LKQ Corp. v. GM Glob. Tech. Operations LLC, No. 2021-2348, 2024 WL 2280728 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2024). The en banc court held that the 鈥搁辞蝉别苍-顿耻谤濒颈苍驳鈥 test was 鈥渋mproperly rigid鈥 and that the Graham v. John Deere framework is the correct test going forward.[1] The court鈥檚 decision ditches decades of precedent applying the Rosen-Durling test, so the decision will likely create uncertainty for years to come as courts grapple with applying the new test to design patents.
The Rosen-Durling test, first established in the 1990s, requires (1) that a primary reference (a 鈥Rosen reference鈥) be 鈥渂asically the same鈥 as the claimed design; and (2) that any secondary references be 鈥渟o related鈥 to the primary reference that features in one reference would suggest application of those features to the other reference.
LKQ argued that the Rosen-Durling test was overly rigid and inconsistent with KSR Int鈥檒 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that the 鈥渂asically the same鈥 and 鈥渟o related鈥 requirements did not 鈥渁dequately align with KSR, Whitman Saddle, and other precedent, both in terms of its framework and threshold rigidity.鈥
The court explained that the 鈥渂asically the same鈥 requirement was inconsistent with Section 103鈥檚 鈥渆xpansive and flexible approach for assessing obviousness,鈥 as well as the Supreme Court鈥檚 1893 decision in Smith v. Whitman Saddle Company.[2] The court explained, using the obviousness analysis in Whitman Saddle, that the 鈥渂asically the same鈥 requirement was a 鈥渞igid rule鈥 and therefore was inconsistent with the Supreme Court鈥檚 KSR analysis that 鈥渨hen a court transforms [a] general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, . . . it errs.鈥
The court similarly explained that the 鈥渟o related鈥 requirement for secondary references under the Rosen-Durling test was inconsistent with 搂 103 and precedent. The court agreed with LKQ that the 鈥渟o related鈥 requirement is 鈥渁nalogous to the rigid application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test rejected by the Supreme Court in KSR.鈥 The court pointed to Whitman Saddle, where the Supreme Court did not ask whether the prior art references were 鈥渟o related鈥 but, instead, explained that it was not inventive to combine the two references due to record evidence.
After overruling the Rosen-Durling test, the court provided the following guidance on applying the Graham factors to design patents:
- For Graham factor one, the court held that the 鈥渁nalogous art鈥 requirement applied to design patents. The court declined, however, to 鈥渄elineate the full and precise contours of the analogous art test for design patents.鈥
- For Graham factor two, the court explained that the proper analysis was to 鈥渃ompare the visual appearance of the claimed design with that of [the] allegedly infringing design鈥 from the perspective of an ordinary designer in the field of the article of manufacture.
- For Graham factor three, the court explained 鈥渢hat obviousness of a design patent claim is assessed from the viewpoint of an ordinary designer in the field to which the claimed design pertains.鈥
- Under Graham factor four, the court reaffirmed that the 鈥渋nquiry focuses on the visual impression of the claimed design as a whole and not on selected individual features.鈥 The court further held that, where the primary reference alone does not render the claimed design obvious, 鈥渢here must be some record-supported reason (without hindsight) that an ordinary designer in the field of the article of manufacture would have modified the primary reference with the feature(s) from the secondary reference(s) to create the same overall appearance as the claimed design.鈥
- The court held that secondary considerations of obviousness or nonobviousness apply to design patents, though it noted certain secondary considerations鈥攕uch as long felt but unsolved needs and failure of others鈥攎ay not apply to design patents.
The court acknowledged that amici curiae raised concerns about the uncertainty that may result from overruling the Rosen-Durling test, but the court disagreed because the 鈥Graham four-part obviousness test for utility patents has existed for a very long time and there is considerable precedent from which the PTO and the courts can draw when assessing obviousness in the design patent context.鈥
Takeaways from Decision
It is unclear why it took 17 years for the Federal Circuit to hold that the Rosen-Durling test is overly rigid under KSR. While the court rejected concerns that overruling Rosen-Durling would create uncertainty, there is little doubt that, in practice, courts, Patent Office examiners, and practitioners will need to grapple with applying the Graham factors to design patents. Given how little guidance the court provided, there will be less certainty in determining the obviousness of design patents until courts develop applicable precedent.
Graham factors aside, the court鈥檚 decision arguably makes it easier to invalidate design patents because prior art references no longer need to be a 鈥Rosen reference鈥 and secondary references do not need to be 鈥渟o related鈥 to the primary reference. This may result in an increase in the number of petitions for post-grant review of design patents and will likely factor into a patent owner鈥檚 decisions whether to assert design patents in litigation.
[1] Judge Lourie concurred in the judgment but did not agree that Rosen and Durling needed to be overruled. In his opinion, the existing test could be made less rigid simply by removing the use of 鈥渕ust鈥 and 鈥渙nly鈥 in the analysis of the tests.
[2] The court acknowledged that, 鈥淸a]t the time [of Whitman Saddle], patent law did not speak of obviousness.鈥