FinCEN Exercises New Authority Targeting Mexico-Based Financial Institutions to Counter Cartel-Linked Fentanyl Trade
On June 25, 2025, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) at the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated three Mexico-based financial institutions as primary money laundering concerns under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act.[1] In the short term, this means that domestic and U.S.-located foreign financial institutions and agents will now have until September 4, 2025 to implement the orders鈥� prohibitions on certain transmittals of funds involving the designated institutions.[2]
Orders Pursuant to the Declared Fentanyl-Trafficking Emergency
FinCEN鈥檚 orders, made pursuant to the Fentanyl Sanctions Act and the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, designate the following three financial institutions on the basis that they are facilitating payments related to the production of fentanyl:
- CIBanco S.A., Instituci贸n de Banca M煤ltiple (CIBanco)[3]
- Intercam Banco S.A., Instituci贸n de Banca M煤ltiple (Intercam)[4]
- Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. (Vector)[5]
FinCEN based its designations on findings indicating that these institutions facilitated transactions between Chinese entities that sell fentanyl precursors and Mexico-based drug cartels that make and market finished fentanyl products. The institutions therefore fall under the ambit of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act of 2019 and the FEND Off Fentanyl Act of 2024.[6]
With these orders FinCEN aims to sever any illicit financial channels supported by money laundering conducted through CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector. The orders will prohibit domestic and U.S.-located foreign financial institutions and agents from engaging in transmittals of funds from or to the three institutions, or from or to any account or convertible virtual currency address administered by or on behalf of them. In practice, however, the orders have already incentivized broader compliance with FinCEN in the form of entities taking proactive steps to distance themselves from these financial institutions. For example, following the FinCEN designations, Visa suspended all international transactions made with CIBanco bank cards.[7] And the Government of Mexico has begun the process of separating the fiduciary units of CIBanco and Intercam and temporarily transferring them to state-owned banks.[8]
Signs of a Broader Shift in Federal Enforcement Priorities
This FinCEN enforcement action likely reflects a broader shift in U.S. federal enforcement priorities, with multiple agencies now intensifying focus on the international narcotics trade, particularly targeting Mexico-based fentanyl traffickers.[9] Shortly after taking office in 2025, President Trump announced an aggressive stance against drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), in part through Executive Order 14157 that directed the State Department and Treasury Department to take related enforcement actions.[10] Following this, the Office of the Attorney General announced its goal of totally eliminating cartels and transnational criminal organizations,[11] the Secretary of State designatedeight Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs),[12] and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice published a memorandum identifying a prioritization of cartel- and TCO-activity within its white-collar enforcement approach.[13]
In the coming months, this enforcement trend may continue and evolve. For example, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the Treasury Department may begin to issue Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) designations targeting persons and entities involved with such cartels and TCOs, especially in activities relating to fentanyl trafficking. Certain entities, including the following, may be at a heightened risk of receiving such designations:
- Financial institutions, especially those that facilitate foreign transactions requiring U.S. correspondent banks, and/or those involved in facilitating transactions between Chinese and Mexican parties;
- Chemical manufacturers, especially those involved in the manufacture of precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl or other illicit narcotics, many of which are based in China (including Hong Kong), India, and Germany;
- Customs brokers facilitating the clearance of goods from countries that will be faced with increased scrutiny; and
- Logistics companies, especially those involved in shipping products into, out of, and within Mexico.
Upon designation, an SDN鈥檚 assets are blocked and transactions with U.S. persons, on U.S. territory, or involving U.S. currency are prohibited. For non-U.S. entities that do business with cartels and TCOs, OFAC might even issue secondary sanctions, effectively severing from the U.S. market not only the cartels and TCOs themselves, but also anyone who does not comply with U.S. sanctions on them. OFAC can pursue civil penalties for any violation of SDN sanctions.
The Justice Department鈥檚 National Security Division may also begin to initiate enforcement actions, including the following:
- Prosecutions under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA),[14] for knowingly providing, or attempting or conspiring to provide, 鈥渕aterial support or resources鈥� to an FTO.[15] The Justice Department has already brought ATA charges against Mexican and Venezuelan nationals鈥攊ndividuals alleged to be members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel[16] and Tren de Aragua,[17] respectively. The Justice Department has even indicted two Americans on grounds of conspiring 鈥渢o provide material support鈥� to a Mexican cartel 鈥渋n the form of U.S. currency鈥� through the operation of a crude oil company based in Texas.[18]
- Prosecutions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) against persons or entities who violate SDN or SDGT sanctions willfully or egregiously.
- Prosecutions related to international money laundering charges that criminalize financial transactions involving the proceeds of unlawful activity, or under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), 31 U.S.C. 搂 5322, which criminalizes failure by a financial institution to meet certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements designed to prevent money laundering. Such prosecutions expose defendants to asset forfeiture and government seizures.[19] In 2024, TD Bank N.A. pleaded guilty and agreed to pay nearly US$2 billion in penalties鈥攁bout a quarter of which were in forfeitures鈥攆ollowing the Justice Department鈥檚 investigation of anti-money laundering and BSA violations that 鈥渁llowed hundreds of millions of dollars from money laundering networks to flow through the bank, including for international drug traffickers.鈥�[20]
This kind of shift in the federal government鈥檚 enforcement approach has precedent. In fact, the current Trump Administration鈥檚 emerging enforcement approach toward Mexican cartels and TCOs appears to resemble the first Trump Administration鈥檚 enforcement escalation against North Korea that began in 2017. That strategy also involved layered and coordinated actions鈥攊ncluding FTO/SDGT designations, FinCEN orders, OFAC SDN designations, and DOJ prosecutions鈥攃ulminating in a robust sanctions and enforcement regime. And, perhaps coincidentally, the U.S. enforcement actions on North Korea in 2017, similar to its enforcement actions on cartels and TCOs today, involved targeting Chinese facilitators.
Heightened Legal and Reputational Risks Within Certain Industries and Regions
The Trump Administration鈥檚 strategic realignment of the federal government鈥檚 enforcement mechanisms against fentanyl traffickers appears poised to create heightened legal and reputational risks for certain companies and individuals. Vulnerable industries include, as stated, financial services, chemical manufacturing, customs-clearance, and logistics and shipping. Key risks include liability for transacting with sanctioned individuals under IEEPA, for materially supporting terrorism under the ATA, for engaging in money laundering, or failing to comply with the BSA. Companies and individuals even risk becoming designated as SDNs themselves and having their assets blocked by the U.S. financial system.
To respond to such risks, companies should implement a comprehensive compliance regime and take steps such as: employing a comprehensive risk assessment that identifies exposure to indirectly or unwillingly aiding drug trafficking and advanced money laundering techniques;聽 enhancing due diligence protocols, especially for counterparties in high-risk jurisdictions to include China (and Hong Kong), Germany, and India; training employees on internal reporting and escalation procedures; and engaging in the other risk-mitigating steps identified by 麻豆直播, such as here.
If you have questions or concerns about the compliance issues raised in this article, please reach out to any of the authors or your 麻豆直播 & Lardner attorney.
The 麻豆直播聽International Government Enforcement Defense & Investigations聽Team is monitoring all international trade and regulatory developments, which we are posting as they occur on our聽Tariff & International Trade Resources聽blog. Our white paper on聽鈥淢anaging Import and Tariff Risks During a Trade War鈥�聽outlines a 12-step plan to provide practical steps to help importers navigate the tariff and international trade risks in the current tariff and trade environment, while the companion white paper on聽鈥淢anaging Supply Chain Integrity Risks鈥�聽provides practical advice to deal with heightened supply chain risks pertaining to goods imported into the United States, including the increasing use of detentions by Customs. If you would like to see future updates regarding 鈥淲hat Every Multinational Company Needs to Know鈥� about operating in today鈥檚 complicated international trade world, please sign up for our Tariff & International Trade blog 鈥斅�
[1] 鈥淭reasury Issues Historic Orders under Powerful New Authority to Counter Fentanyl,鈥� U.S. Treasury Dep鈥檛 (June 25, 2025), .
[2] 鈥淭reasury Extends Effective Dates of Orders Issued Under New Authority to Counter Fentanyl,鈥� Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (July 9, 2025), .
[3] Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving CIBanco S.A., Instituci贸n de Banca Multiple, 90鈥疐ed.鈥疪eg.鈥�27770 (June 30,鈥�2025).
[4] Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving Intercam Banco S.A., Instituci贸n de Banca Multiple, 90鈥疐ed.鈥疪eg.鈥�27777 (June 30, 2025).
[5] Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V., 90鈥疐ed.鈥疪eg.鈥�27764 (June鈥�30,鈥�2025).
[6] 21鈥疷.S.C. 搂鈥�2313a; Public Law 118鈥�50 (H.R.鈥�815), Division E (鈥淔END Off Fentanyl Act鈥�), Title I, Subtitle A, enacted April 24, 2024.
[7] 鈥淰isa suspends international transactions made with CIBanco cards,鈥� Mexico Daily News (July 1, 2025), .
[8] 鈥淢exico Shifts CIBanco, Intercam Trusts to State Banks,鈥� Mexico Business News (July 8, 2025), .
[9] 麻豆直播 has been following and analyzing the Trump Administration鈥檚 actions: 鈥淲hat Every Multinational Company (Doing Business in Mexico) Should Know About . . . Mitigating Risks From ATA Scrutiny in a New Enforcement Regime鈥� (March 6, 2025), /insights/publications/2025/03/multinational-company-business-mexico-mitigating-risks-ata-scrutiny/; 鈥淲hat Every Multinational Company Should Know About . . . Mitigating Risks Posed by the New Trump Administration Focus on Drug Cartels and TCOs鈥� (June 17, 2025), /insights/publications/2025/06/multinational-company-mitigating-risk-focus-drug-cartels-tco/.
[10] Executive Order 14157, 鈥淒esignating Cartels and Other Organizations As Foreign Terrorist Organizations And Specially Designated Global Terrorists鈥� (Jan. 20, 2025), .
[11] 鈥淭otal Elimination of Cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations,鈥� Office of the Attorney General (Feb. 5, 2025), .
[12] 鈥淒esignation of International Cartels,鈥� Office of the Spokesperson of the U.S. State Dep鈥檛 (Feb. 20, 2025), .
[13] 鈥淔ocus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime,鈥� Criminal Division of U.S. Dep鈥檛 of State 聽(May 12, 2025), .
[14] There is also a risk of civil liability under the ATA. The statute allows for U.S. national victims and their estates or heirs to bring claims against defendants alleged to have aided and abetted an 鈥渋njury arising from an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization.鈥� 18 U.S.C. 搂 2333(a).
[15] 18 U.S.C. 搂 2333 (2024).
[16] 鈥淢exican Indicted in US in First After Cartel Designated as Terrorist Group,鈥� Reuters (May 16, 2025), .
[17] 鈥淛ustice Department brings first terrorism case against alleged high-ranking TdA gang member,鈥� AP News (April 23, 2025), .
[18] 鈥淔ather and Son indicted for Providing Material Support to Mexican Cartel Engaged in Terrorism,鈥� U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (May 30, 2025), . 聽
[19] See 18 U.S.C. 搂搂 981鈥�82; 31 U.S.C. 搂 5317(c).
[20] 鈥淭D Bank Pleads Guilty to Bank Secrecy Act and Money Laundering Conspiracy Violations in $1.8B Resolution,鈥� U.S. Dep鈥檛 of Justice (Oct. 10, 2024).